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Abstract 
This paper explores core failures of environmental economics as a scientific attempt to 
understand the ecological crises.  The case of environmental pollution is used to show how 
neoclassical externality theory evolved to establish commitment to, and dogmatic support for, 
an elitist ethics and liberal market ideology.  The public policy response to pollution then 
recommended is to internalise externalities by correcting market prices based on monetary 
valuation of the social costs (i.e., damages).  Pollution as a market failure is deemed a 
correctible error of the price system.  This is contrast with an alternative theory of pollution 
based on a classic institutional economic theory of cost-shifting that instead requires a public 
policy response involving regulation and planning.  Reflection on the history of thought 
related to these two theories of pollution reveals how environmental economics became a 
marginalised field supporting the neoclassical economic orthodoxy with full commitment to 
its core paradigms.  Why the critical and realist institutional approach had to be suppressed is 
explained as denying the potential for a revolutionary paradigm shift in economic price 
theory. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental economics appeared in the 1960s along with the growth in public 
environmental awareness, as a direct response to the rise of environmental problems (Spash 
1999).  By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the promise of material wealth for all through 
economic growth and post World War II optimism in the abilities of science and technology 
were faltering.  Economic growth was strongly debated and increasingly criticised as 
positively misleading in terms of the consequences for human society (e.g., Mishan 1969a; 
Hodson 1972; Meadows et al. 1972; Olson and Landsberg 1973; Barkley and Seckler 1972; 
Daly 1974, 1972; Hirsch 1977; Scitovsky 1976; Schumacher 1973).  Already Boulding (1966) 
had characterised the economy as being run like the wild west, populated by cowboys who 
exploited resources, chucked their waste on the ground and rode away to infinite horizons—
where lay the promise of fresh resources and new environments to exploit and degrade.  This 
was contrast with Earth as a type of closed system, like a spaceship, where material supplies 
were fixed, energy limited and waste remained within the system.  In order to understand the 
predicament of human kind, the challenge appeared to be to create a totally new approach to 
economics. 
Environmental economics then appeared both innovative, progressive and potentially 
revolutionary.  For example, Bohm and Kneese (1971: ix-x) introduced their edited volume, 
The Economics of the Environment, stating that this was “a profession rethinking, extending, 
and revising its concepts, and finding new applications for them”.  They drew a parallel with 
“the ferment in the profession when the Keynesian revolution was in progress”, and claimed 
history was in the making.  The potential for a paradigm shift in the mode of Kuhn’s theory of 
science seemed possible (Kuhn 1970 [1962]).  As Kapp (1978 [1971]: 310) stated: 
“When empirical data and new facts become incompatible with, or can no longer be 
accounted for by established theories, the time has come for the formulation of new 
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concepts, new modes of thought and procedures.  This is the time of ‘scientific 
revolutions’.” 
The reality was to be a little different, and some of the reasons why a revolution in economic 
thought failed are discussed here in terms of a Kuhnian paradigmatic defence of price-making 
markets. 
In doing so, the paradigm shift theory of Kuhn (1970 [1962]) should itself not be 
adopted uncritically (Spash 2020; Buch-Hansen 2018).  While useful for raising issues of 
sociology of science, Kuhn’s approach appears problematic as a general theory for 
understanding scientific change (especially in the social sciences).  In particular, decades of 
overwhelming evidence of ‘anomalies’ relating to neoclassical economic theory have not 
created the collapse of that theory.  Instead competing paradigms exist alongside each other.  
What becomes the mainstream, orthodoxy and dominant economic theory appears to be that 
most suited to supporting the political hegemonic structure, rather than a theory providing a 
realistic explanation of the economic process.  There is then a tension between realism as to 
the object of study (i.e., social systems, economies, institutions, provisioning systems), and 
the creation of an organisational scientific structure that affirms/denies the validity of 
scientific practice in a field of knowledge. 
Environmental understanding is a fundamental criticism of actual capital accumulating 
economic systems in general and price-making market capitalism in particular.  The challenge 
posed by environmental problems to the economics profession itself means both fundamental 
rethinking of professional practice, and radically changing the orthodox understanding of 
modern capital accumulating society and its structure.  The importance of political economy 
is re-established because who gets exploited and polluted and who gets to extract and use 
resources is fundamentally about power relations in society.  The scale and substantive nature 
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of environmental problems points towards the systemic failures of the modern industrialised 
economies and the necessity for social ecological transformation of actual economies. 
How this need for revolutionary change in actual economics has been denied goes hand-
in-hand with the control of economic understanding. This is then a matter of the extent to 
which economic researchers feel dependent upon the use of existing paradigmatically 
enforced procedures to construct their own knowledge claims and professional identities.  In 
creating a field of knowledge psychological and political factors combine.  A researcher who 
feels the necessity to convince colleagues of the importance of their particular concerns 
typically conforms to existing practice in order to obtain a high reputational standing in a 
given field.  The researcher themselves becomes defined by their commitment to the 
disciplinary doctrines.  Economics as a disciplinary field then controls and delimits ideas 
about the environment, while key individuals that conform to paradigmatic doctrines act to 
prevent a scientific revolutionary change.  In economics has then been an on-going tension 
between paradigmatic conformity and an encroaching social, ecological and economic reality. 
The contributions of economists, during the rise of environmentalism, developed 
around a distinct set of connected research agendas.  First, there was the relationship of 
environmental problems to the growth economy with its massive input of materials and 
energy justified as necessary to meet the ever expanding wants of the consumer.  Second, 
there was the analysis of how an economic system, that was meant to be creating wealth and 
well-being for all, could be creating and justifying harm (i.e., social costs) as a regular part of 
business practice?  Third, there was the need to measure these harms,1 and develop techniques 
and tools by which they could be placed on the public policy agenda, which led to monetary 
valuation of environmental impacts. Fourth, there was the design and recommendation of 
                                                 
1 There were also recognised benefits (e.g. aesthetics, recreation) that economists associated with 
environmental change, and these were similarly to be measured and monetised. 
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appropriate policy measures (e.g. regulation, planning, taxes, subsidies, permit trading).  All 
these research agendas posed major potential challenges to the dominant economic theory and 
could have been revolutionary endeavours, but they became nothing more than mildly 
reformist or totally conformist. 
This paper is part of an ongoing project, addressing the struggle for revolutionary 
change in economics, that will be published as a book including a chapter covering this four 
point research agenda.  Here I will limit the discussion primarily to the second research 
agenda with implications for the third.  In particular, the practice of regarding occurrences of 
pollution as externalities will be critically analysed and shown to be inferior to an alternative 
institutional cost-shifting explanation.  The orthodox treatment of pollution events as minor 
correctible market failures is show to conflict with the realisation—already apparent in the 
1960s and the then emerging field of systems ecology—that production and consumption in a 
modern economy continuously creates harm on a scale and with consequences that are major 
problems for human society as well as non-human Nature.  Pollution is an all pervasive 
phenomenon, not a minor aberration in an otherwise perfectly functioning price-making 
market system.  That pervasive pollution is an integral part of how competitive agents operate 
to make profits and gains at others expense is then best understood as cost-shifting.  The next 
section traces the history of thought relating to how the theory arose that established the 
standard approach of regarding pollution as an externality to be fixed by getting the prices 
right in the market place.  This is followed by an exploration of the cost-shifting approach that 
reveals how environmental economists rejected their own foundational insights and 
reinterpreted the works of others, such as Pigou, to conform with neoclassical economics and 
an increasingly neoliberal agenda. 
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II. POLLLUTION AS A MARKET FAILURE 
Environmental economists know the market fails to price all the benefits and costs associated 
with the use of natural resources and the environment.  However, this perspective must also 
be constrained lest it go too far and threaten the political utopian project of achieving an 
unregulated price-making market economy.  So, they argue, price-making markets merely 
need some expert help to be perfect.  This is the basic justification for conducting monetary 
valuation exercises using cost-benefit analysis.  They are part of a weak political reformist 
agenda going back a hundred years. 
The line of reasoning adopted by environmental economists is derived from a theory 
of industrial “external economies” originating with Marshall (1916), and further developed by 
the conceptualisation of social costs in the work of Pigou (1920).  Marshall was concerned 
about social benefits from infrastructure and how one firms location can benefit from 
another’s (e.g., one builds a road and a second comes along and uses it without having paid 
anything).  Pigou (1920: 159-163) expanded on this idea to cover a range of factors outside 
the planning process.  However, in his widely cited book The Economics of Welfare, he never 
used the term ‘externalities’.  Instead, he talked of “divergences between marginal social net 
product and marginal trade net product”, as well as “uncompensated services” and “incidental 
uncharged disservices” (ibid).  Pigou gives several examples of disservices, including: 
building developments that remove play areas, injure the “health and efficiency of families 
living there”, crowd out existing properties and reduce air quality; running of motor cars that 
wear out the surface of roads; production and sale of intoxicants causing extra costs in terms 
of policemen and prisons; wars waged to obtain foreign trade and investment returns; and 
women doing factory work while pregnant impacting on the health of the child (ibid: 162-
163).  He explained that some such problems could be addressed by government interventions 
using economic incentives. 
 6 
“It is plain that divergences between private and social net product of the kinds we have 
so far been considering cannot, like divergences due to tenancy laws, be mitigated by a 
modification of the contractual relation between any two contracting parties, because 
the divergence arises out of a service or disservice rendered to persons other than the 
contracting parties. It is, however, possible for the State, if it so chooses, to remove the 
divergence in any field by "extraordinary encouragements" or "extraordinary restraints" 
upon investments in that field. The most obvious forms which these encouragements 
and restraints may assume are, of course, those of bounties [i.e., subsidies] and taxes.” 
(ibid: 168) 
The term “extraordinary encouragements” is borrowed from Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
(e.g., Smith 1976 [1776]: 14, 182, 275, 493, 742, 838, 914).  Smith also uses variations such 
as extraordinary privileges, restrictions and restraints (ibid: 864, 881, 914) and extraordinary 
taxes (ibid: 1142). These are general references by Smith to various forms of government 
intervention to encourage/discourage types of trade and industrial production.  Pigou (1920) 
then proceeds to also give general examples of financial incentives in actual policy (e.g. 
taxing alcohol, housing developers paying for free playgrounds, petrol taxes and motor car 
licenses, national insurance taxes, taxing income from foreign investments).2  However, none 
of these cases involve economists calculating the social costs to set the “bounties and taxes”. 
In fact, in a later work, Pigou (1947) explicitly argues that quantifying social costs is 
impossible.  He states that, “the practical difficulties of determining the right rates of bounty 
and duty would be extraordinarily great” (Pigou 1947: 42).  He questions the possibility of 
ascertaining social cost in terms of money.  He specifically asks: “how are we to make the 
corresponding calculation for a factory industry the smoke of which increase the expenses of 
                                                 
2 Other types of cases are also considered such as urban planning and zoning laws, slum clearance, 
worker retraining, maternity leave and liability for healthcare. 
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the public in washing and cleaning?” (ibid: 43).  Similarly, he questions the ability to 
calculate benefits from planting forests that improve climatic conditions.  He makes clear that 
the examples he gave in The Economics of Welfare were of a different sort when he states 
that:  
“so far as I know, no attempt has ever been made in a capitalist régime to use bounties 
and duties for bringing about adjustments of the kind I have been describing.  Up to the 
present suggestions in this matter have been confined to the writings of economists; and 
even they have never attempted the quantitative study that would be necessary before 
their suggestions could be applied to practice.” 
That social costs could not be addressed as in “the writings of economists” by a system of 
“bounties and duties” (i.e., internalised by subsidies and taxes) runs counter to the claims 
made for ‘Pigouvian taxes’ by others, after Pigou’s demise.  Concerning this impossibility 
Pigou himself speculates that “Maybe, it demonstrates in this field the bankruptcy of 
capitalism”.3  So, somewhat amazingly, in contradiction of his promotion by neoclassical 
economists as founder of the method for internalising externalities via tax/subsidy,4 Pigou 
here argues against the possibility of the very tax which later bears his name. 
Pigou’s critique of both the possibility of internalising social costs in this way and of 
capitalism have both been forgotten.  More generally, as noted by Kapp (1978 [1963]: 40), the 
                                                 
3 In attempting this social cost calculation he believes a central planning authority would fair no better 
than the government of a capitalist State. However, he concluded his book in favour of a socialist State 
agenda including removing inequalities via income taxation, investment in health and education, 
nationalisation of industries and the central bank, and national planning of most capital investment.  At 
the same time Pigou should not be read as some naïve advocate of government intervention, as 
ignorantly attempted by Coase (see Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2015: 166-169).  Part II Chapter XVII 
“State Intervention” of his Economics of Welfare makes clear his awareness of institutional context 
determining good outcomes from interventions by public authorities (Pigou 1920). 
4 For example the Pigou Club established by Gregory Mankiw in 2006 has advocated ‘Pigouvian 
taxes’, e.g., to address human induced climate change and road congestion (Lovejoy Knight 2018: 65).  
This Club has included amongst its members: Gary Becker, Robert Frank, Paul Krugman, Nouriel 
Roubini and Lawrence Summers (Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2015: 97). 
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dismissal by economists of problems in social cost calculation, and the narrowing down of the 
concept itself, resulted from the rise of ‘new welfare economics’ (e.g., Little 1950).  This 
claims to remove the need for social evaluation and defines social welfare as the sum of 
individual utility.  Its methodological individualism denies the existence of social 
phenomenon and society as distinct or having emergent properties.  The underlying ethical 
basis is preference utilitarianism.  Welfare comparisons across individuals (i.e., how much a 
change harms or benefits different individuals) are meant to be avoided by adopting the 
criteria of only making policies that make people better-off and none worse-off.  This is 
attributed to the Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (1948-1923) and regarded 
by neoclassical economists as a criterion of efficiency (i.e. prescribing whether a resource 
reallocation would be desirable on grounds of maximising welfare or utility).  Mainstream 
economists seem to regard this Pareto Criterion as an uncontroversial ethical concept.  Some 
suspicion as to its ethical bias might have been raised by the fact that its originator supported 
elitist social theories and welcomed Mussolini’s fascism.  Indeed, consistent with this political 
ideology, the theory allows policies that make the elite better-off while doing nothing for 
anyone else. 
In policy terms, the Pareto Criterion is typically unworkable because somebody is 
nearly always made worse-off.  Hence Kaldor and Hicks tried to salvage the situation by 
putting forward an alternative prescriptive criterion where only the ability to potentially (but 
not actually) compensate for harm was now promoted as a good test for making efficient 
policy (Hanley and Spash 1993).  Mishan (1969b) notes that Kaldor and Hicks erroneously 
claimed “an objective method of detecting increases in ‘wealth’ or ‘efficiency’ had been 
discovered”, and that its implications were also ethically unacceptable.  In addition, this 
merely reintroduced the problem of assessing welfare differences; that is, in order to 
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determine the amount of monetary transfers necessary to leave those harmed potentially no 
worse-off.  Such problems are learnt by mainstream economists and duly forgotten. 
New welfare economics then combined with externality theory to justify mild 
reformism in response to ecological destruction, because the projects causing this destruction 
could be deemed to create greater benefits (to the elite) than harms (to the poor).  This may 
also be described more crudely as jobs (code for capitalist profits) are more valuable than the 
environment (i.e., health of poor people and non-humans).  Pollution impacts could, the 
argument goes, potentially be paid for and harm compensated, making nobody worse-off and 
somebody better-off.  More than this, contra Pigou, the harm could be converted into money 
and included in a calculation of marginal social costs relating to a production process so that 
the price mechanisms could be adjusted to achieve allocative (Pareto) efficiency, i.e., 
externalities could be internalised.  However, this theory of pollution externalities took some 
decades to appear. 
Besides Pigou’s work the discussion of external economies and diseconomies 
developed little from Marshall into the 1950s, and actually paid small or no attention to 
pollution.  For example, Scitovsky (1954) noted the potential for activities of a producer 
impacting on people’s “personal satisfaction” and occurring “in ways that do not operate 
through the market mechanism”.  More specifically he stated that: “These may be called the 
producer's "direct" (i.e., nonmarket) influence on personal satisfaction and are best known by 
the example of the factory that inconveniences the neighborhood with the fumes or noise that 
emanate from it” (Scitovsky 1954: 144).  However, his primary concern was with Marshallian 
industrial external economies affecting businesses profitability and productivity.  The external 
diseconomy as found in the case of industrial pollution he thought was “exceptional, because 
most instances of it can be and usually are eliminated by zoning ordinances and industrial 
regulation concerned with public health and safety” (ibid). 
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In the early 1960s the terms ‘externality’ and ‘externalities’ started appearing in the 
context of theoretical papers on diseconomies and social costs and including passing 
references to localised industrial smoke pollution (Turvey 1963; Buchanan and Stubblebine 
1962).  The specific term ‘externalities’ is attributed by Kapp (1978 [1971]: 8) to Samuelson, 
appearing on page 476 of the 1961 edition of his influential neoclassical textbook, Economics.  
An earlier reference using the term externalities is the discussion by Bator (1958), who 
includes discussion of the importance of Samuelson’s (1954) work on public goods as being 
connected to aspects of externalities, although that work does not actually include the term.  
Regardless of origins, by the mid-60s Castle (1965: 548) can be found specifically discussing 
pollution externalities and noting more emphatically that: “The economics of quality of the 
environment is emerging as a problem of major importance”.  Yet, despite this development 
and expanding attention to externality theory, half a decade later, in his review of the 
externality literature, Mishan (1971b: 1) noted that: 
“although environmental spillovers have been prominent in the news over the last few 
years, the bulk of the recent literature has confined its investigations to inter-industry, 
inter-firm, and inter-person externalities.  Economists respond to real world problems 
with a time lag, initially making use of more familiar, if less relevant, bits of apparatus.” 
In addition, Kapp (1978 [1971]: 8) notes that despite the increasing discussion of externalities, 
what remained unrecognised was that “these so-called external diseconomies and social 
benefits are not isolated cases but are widespread and inevitable phenomena under conditions 
of business enterprise”. 
This situation seems to have only substantively changed in the 1970s.  Undoubtedly 
interest was stimulated by concerns over the impacts of economic growth (e.g., Mishan 
1969a; Meadows et al. 1972).  In addition, within environmental economics, the development 
of materials balance theory pointed to the systemic aspects of pollution due to the material 
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and energy throughput of industrial society (Kneese, Ayres, and d'Arge 1970; Ayres and 
Kneese 1969).  Discussions of what were now called Pigouvian taxes on pollution 
externalities were also underway (Baumol 1972; Baumol and Oates 1971). By the mid-1970s 
an externality theory of pollution was well established and appearing in the new textbooks on 
environmental economics, along with the idea of internalising externalities via Pigouvian 
taxes (e.g., Pearce 1978 [1976]; Mäler 1974). 
Externality theory then proceeded to develop into a more elaborate justification for all 
environmental problems as being correctable market failures.  The resulting modern 
neoclassical externality theory treats environmental problems as minor aberrations in an 
otherwise perfectly functioning price-making market system.  Hence the rhetoric of ‘getting 
the prices right’ to ‘solve’ environmental problems.  For example, Lord Stern calls human 
induced climate change the largest market failure ever (Benjamin 2007), not because he 
wishes to overthrow price-making markets under capitalism, but exactly the opposite.  As a 
market failure it is subject to correction by adjusting market prices to supposedly account for 
the harm created, and through economic instruments markets can be made to ‘internalise 
externalities’. This allows Stern to promote his favoured solution, carbon emission trading, 
regardless of its problems and the divorce between economic models and reality (Spash 
2009). 
Environmental economists then pursue and teach a model that places a liberal (and 
increasingly neoliberal) political ideology at its core.  That is, they assume that individuals 
can freely negotiate constraints on their own freedom and establish contracts that enforce the 
outcome.  They characterise pollution as one-off market failures occurring as local problems 
between two actors (e.g., smoke producing factor and laundry). Pollution problems are 
claimed to be easily and optimally corrected simply by getting people to negotiate 
independently, which is a common misreading of Coase (1960) by economists (see 
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Frischmann and Marciano 2014).  Where such negotiation is absent the claim is that pollution 
is already ‘optimal’ due to transactions costs—a Panglossian flaw in their logic noted by 
Mishan (1971a).5  Those in the economics profession who are ideologically anti-government 
(a stance popular since the rise of neoliberalism) employ the transaction cost argument to 
oppose intervention into price-making markets.  Although, even on its own grounds, a counter 
argument is that governments/regulators can use a variety of institutional arrangements (e.g., 
liability rules and laws) designed to reduce overall societal costs so making their intervention 
more efficient (Coase 1960: 17-18).  Interestingly the simplistic or ‘toy model’ of pollution 
externalities that justify neoclassical economists analysis were imposed by mainstream 
economists on Coase, contrary to his opposition to them (Frischmann and Marciano 2014).  
What the abstract simple model achieves is to set down the core conceptual parameters within 
which further discussion is to be held.  More specifically pollution policy is then framed in 
terms of monetary costs and benefits, in a world where agents possess equal power and 
knowledge, and consequences are knowable and known. 
While the basic model is a recognised simplistic abstraction its features are carried 
over to the more advanced texts that include more complex models and all sorts of caveats to 
address ‘anomalies’.  Some physical characteristics of real environmental problems may then 
be brought in, but in highly restricted ways that must conform to the formalist model and its 
method.  Environmental economists then spend their time relaxing single constraints, one at a 
time, in the ceteris paribus mechanical world of mathematical marginal analysis, static 
models and partial equilibria. 
                                                 
5 Dr. Pangloss is a character in Candide (1759) a satirical story by Voltaire.  Dr. Pangloss believes the 
world as actualised cannot be improved upon, despite repeatedly confronting evidence to the contrary. 
Voltaire was caricaturing and lampooning the German idealist philosopher Leibniz for his claim that 
God must have made the best world possible. 
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What comes first is the model not the actuality of any pollutant or ecosystem or the 
fallibility of human knowledge about them.  Regardless of model complexity, the basic 
logical flaw remains, namely trying to explain reality by extrapolating from a totally 
deductive theoretical construct that has little or nothing to do with the object of study in the 
first place and that builds from false premises.  Real and substantive pollution problems 
involve such things as long-range transport of multiple air pollutants from dispersed sources 
with multiple impacts from now into the distant future subject to strong uncertainty, i.e., 
indeterminacy and ignorance (Spash 2002).  However, the unreality of the environmental 
economists’ approach does not prevent use of the theory for justify actual policy prescriptions 
and associated claims of ability to achieve optimal pollution control and efficient outcomes.6  
The point is that the power of the theory lies in its political usefulness as a rhetorical tool.  In 
the neoliberal era an ideological commitment to a price-making market paradigm is required 
for designation as an expert economist, not the scientific validity of explanations let alone 
descriptive reality. 
 
III. POLLUTION AS A COST-SHIFTING SUCCESS 
Interestingly, the story of pollution as externality, and associated correction of market failure 
via pricing, was already contradicted by environmental economists’ own early work on the 
laws of thermodynamics (Kneese, Ayres, and d'Arge 1970).  What was termed ‘materials 
balance theory’ incorporated the law of conservation of mass, i.e. that it could be neither 
created nor destroyed.  The conclusion was that pollution is all pervasive and a normal part of 
economic activity.  Externalities associated with the disposal of residuals from modern 
                                                 
6 For an example of the resulting problems for policy see my papers on carbon trading (Spash 2010) 
and biodiversity offsets (Spash 2015). 
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consumption and production activities cannot then be treated as exceptional, rare or 
unimportant.  As Kneese, Ayres and d′Arge (1970: 4-5) make very clear: 
“In reality they are a normal, indeed inevitable, part of these processes.  Their economic 
significance tends to increases as economic development proceeds, and the ability of the 
natural environment to receive and assimilate them is an important natural resource of 
rapidly increasing value.  We suggest below that the common failure to recognize these 
facts in economic theory may result from viewing the production and consumption 
processes in a manner which is somewhat at variance with the fundamental physical law 
of conservation of mass.” 
Once the all pervasiveness of pollution is apparent then so also is the way in which pollution 
is misconceptualised as external rather than internal to economic systems. 
Complementing this critical insight is the reinterpretation of social relationships integral 
in modern economic systems as explored, in a little know article, by Hunt and d′Arge (1973). 
They show how the combination of pervasive pollution with standard economic assumptions 
about agents and markets turns economic theory on its head.  The argument runs as follows.  
Homo œconomicus will maximize the value of participating in organised markets and creating 
nonmarket transactions.  Such agents gain by imposing losses on others, and they gain more 
the more they can shift costs on to others.  The same incentive Adam Smith regarded as 
producing only unintended good is responsible for selecting only highly productive ‘external 
effects’.  All individuals acting independently to ‘externalise costs’ will yield a maximum of 
these costs imposed on others.  Rather than the benevolent invisible hand, guiding the 
allocation of resources to the benefit of all, the capitalist price-making market economy had 
an invisible foot, continuously booting the majority of people in the backside (Hunt and 
d'Arge 1973: 348).  Successful agents shift costs on to others to the maximum of their ability 
and must be paid, or rather bribed, to reduce their damaging activities by the recipient of their 
 15 
costs. Such an outcome is described in positive terms by various supporters of ‘free’ market 
ideology and so is a case of efficient neoclassical arbitrage, a liberal Coasian solution and a 
neoliberal ideal. 
None of this was in fact new in the early 1970s.  The idea of cost shifting had been 
thoroughly explored and explained, without the connection to the laws of physics, by Kapp 
(1950, 1963).  Kapp was highly critical of the mainstream economic conceptualisation of 
social costs as externalities (Kapp 1970, 1969). Indeed, he rejected the idea of pollution as an 
externality because it inaccurately describes what are deliberate acts of cost-shifting in the 
search for profit; a critique that corresponds to that of institutional economist Clark’s theories 
concerning the operation of the firm (Berger 2017: 99-114).  Accordingly, success in business 
is achieved by passing on costs to others, and/or taking benefits from them without incurring 
personal costs.  Kapp’s 1963 book, posthumously reprinted in 1978, presented a detailed 
thesis of the manner in which private enterprise, under conditions of unregulated competition, 
gives rise to social costs that are shifted to and borne by third persons and the community as a 
whole (Kapp 1978 [1963]: 29). 
Kapp (1978 [1963]: 14) defined such social costs as harmful effects and inefficiencies 
that: (i) must be avoidable and (ii) were a part of productive activities that could be shifted to 
others.  That is, producers could avoid or minimise the harm of pollution that they create in 
their production processes, but instead they chose to pass on the harm to their workers and the 
wider environment in order to make personal gains.  The pursuit of private gain places a 
premium on the minimization of the private costs of current production, and the more this is 
emphasised the greater the probability of social costs.  The analysis applied equally to a 
Russian Soviet style incentive system as to that of the Western market economies.  Industrial 
managers in planned economic systems operating under competitive institutions are as 
susceptible as profit seeking capitalists operating in competitive market systems.  Indeed the 
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problem might be found anywhere that the emphasis is placed on the individual competing 
with and achieving advantage over others for their own personal gain. 
More than this Kapp highlighted the failure at the heart of neoclassical economics as a 
means for addressing environmental pollution and other social costs. 
“For the fact that private entrepreneurs are able to shift part of the total costs of 
production to other persons or to the community as a whole, points to one of the most 
important limitations of the scope of neoclassical value theory.  As long as it continues 
to confine itself to market value neoclassical economics will fail to assimilate to its 
reasoning and to its conceptual system many of the costs (and returns) which cannot 
be expressed in dollars and cents.” (Kapp 1971: 11) 
Kapp then advocated government regulation and planning as a means to achieve socially 
acceptable standards for pollutants, e.g., natural balance, maximum permissible concentration, 
safe minimum standards and objective requirements of human health (Kapp 1978 [1963]: 93).  
This corresponds with a critical institutional economic approach that emphasises the 
cumulative character of social causation and the need for objective criteria of social welfare 
for the appraisal of the social efficiency of economic systems.  It also raises the importance of 
addressing the quality of human life and behaviour under different institutional arrangements 
(Kapp 1978 [1963]: xxvii).  Kapp had written extensively on the link with institutional 
economics and highlighted this as a central concern of his work on social costs.7 
In summary, externalities are not external to economic actors, but part of how the 
modern growth economy, and its profit seeking and utility maximising self-obsessed actors, 
                                                 
7 Bringing the work closer to a tradition in institutional analysis was given as the reason why he had 
adjusted the book’s title (see the preface dated 1962 for the second edition of his book on social costs 
Kapp 1978 [1963] xxvii).  Another book specifically addressing the foundations of institutional 
economics was left incomplete when he died, but was finally published after some diligent research 
and editorial work by Berger and Steppacher (Kapp, Berger, and Steppacher 2011). 
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must function within the competitive institutions of the price-making market system.  Kapp 
(1950, 1963, 1978 [1963]) had already been at pains to explain this cost-shifting activity and 
the various ways in which it could be seen operating both environmentally, via pollution, but 
also socially in the relationships of the work place and the institutions of consumerism.  This 
was a fundamentally different critique than the ‘all social costs are minor problems and can be 
fixed by taxes’ approach of mainstream economics attributed, rather misleadingly, to Pigou. 
In fact Pigou himself actually recognised the limits to markets and the need for central 
planning and regulation.  As he states, before praising the introduction of the 1909 Housing 
and Town Planning Act: 
“It is as idle to expect a well planned town to result from the independent activities of 
isolated speculators as it would be to expect a satisfactory picture to result if each 
separate square inch were painted by an independent artist.  No ‘invisible hand’ can be 
relied on to produce a good arrangement of the whole from a combination of separate 
treatments of the parts.  It is, therefore, necessary that an authority of wider reach 
should intervene and should tackle the collective problems of beauty, of air, and of 
light, as those other collective problems of gas and water have been already tackled.” 
(Pigou 1920: 170-171) 
Pigou has been selectively read, and the embedding of market institutions in a planning 
system that he recommended has conveniently been forgotten in the move to economic 
systems dominated by price-making markets where government intervention is derided as 
authoritarian control. 
As resource and environmental economics was largely an American phenomena, 
developed in the years of the cold war, so its approach took on facets of political ideology 
from that context.  This meant denouncing planning under the rhetoric of ‘command and 
control’ in opposition to the ‘free market’.  A hidden ideological and political discourse was 
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employed to frame the debate as totalitarianism vs. democracy, communism vs. liberalism, 
evil vs. good.  In the mid-1980s university higher education in environmental economics was 
still basically limited to North America where the approach to topics was itself controlled and 
the curriculum restricted (e.g., postgraduate education excluding philosophy of science and 
history of thought).  In this atmosphere ecological economics would appear as a challenge to 
what had become a captured orthodox economics of the environment that heavily delimited 
what was legitimate to research and discuss, as well as the terms in which that discussion 
might be conducted (Spash 1999).  Yet, the emergence of such an alternative was far from 
straight forward and it has remained in a paradigmatic contest with the mainstream (Spash 
2013, 2011, 2020). 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The failure of a revolutionary heterodox environmental economics to appear was in part a 
reflection of the power which lies in orthodox economics to control debate, forgive mild non-
conformists and excommunicate heretics and blasphemers.  Most fundamentally, the entire 
thrust of the original work towards a new and challenging research agenda had to be denied 
whenever and wherever this proved problematic for price theory, price-making markets or a 
growth economy.  At the end of the day, environmental economics came to offer a narrow, 
constricted and dogmatic approach to the four challenging research agendas set-out in the 
introduction. 
In the space of twenty years, or so, environmental economics had become totally 
conformist.  First, the growth economy was no longer to be questioned but merely accepted, 
and in light of ‘sustainable development’ was to be regarded as leading to a better world.  The 
early concern expressed for incorporating biophysical reality into economics was dropped 
completely.  Nature was now to be treated as capital and made totally substitutable.  This 
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meant that environmental losses could be compensated perfectly by more human artefacts, 
education and social relationships (i.e. man-made capital, human capital and social capital).  
Second, the creation of harm was simply a matter of the wrong price structure, a simple 
externality that could easily be corrected if there were the political will to do so.  Even better 
the system could be left to itself if government would just extend private property rights to 
cover everything in the world and individuals were free to trade and bargain this property.  
Third, the extent of any externality (i.e. harm created to others both human and non-human) 
could be assessed through monetary valuation, which could also determine the optimal level 
of pollution by setting the value of all the harms against the costs of pollution control.  Cost-
benefit analysis was then the central means for justifying public policy intervention, or non-
intervention, as the case may be.  The use of revealed preferences in markets gave way to 
stated preferences inferred from expert designed public surveys (i.e. contingent valuation and 
choice experiments).  Fourth, the regulatory mechanisms to be employed in any government 
intervention should be those of the price-making market.  Initially taxes and subsidies were 
favoured, but these soon fell by the wayside as the rise of neoliberalism hollowed-out central 
government and replaced it with central corporatism.  Instead price-making markets would 
provide the best solution, and this meant creating new markets for buying and selling the 
environment in all its aspects, e.g., pollution, wildlife, biodiversity, ecosystem services.  
Tradable permits became the policy option of choice.  Any social and economic critique was 
marginalised and the field divorced from biophysical reality. 
Substantive alternative answers to the four research questions, prior to the arrival of 
modern ecological economics, were most comprehensively given by Kapp, whose writing 
provides foundational work for a social ecological economics (see Spash 2012, 2017).  His 
thesis describes a very different world from the mainstream economic positions prevalent 
today.  The capital accumulating economy, with its emphasis on competition and individual 
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self-interest, is the road to social misery and environmental destruction.  The social 
metabolism of the economic structure needs to be explicitly planned and the institutions of 
exploitation and alienation deconstructed and replaced by those of social inclusion.  
Environmental and social harms need to be addressed via social minima to provide for basic 
objective needs and protection of the innocent.  Monetary valuation is not a good approach 
and results in misdirecting public policy.  Planning not markets are the favoured approach and 
this requires participation, accountability and multi-level governance.  This is the agenda 
awaiting a radical social ecological reformation of economics. 
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